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JUDICIAL NOTICE AND REBUTTING EVIDENCE
Judicial notice is defined as, "the doctrine that the law will take cognizance
of certain facts without proof, either because of their universal notoriety, or the fact
is common knowledge within the jurisdiction of the court, or is closely related to
the official character of the court."
The doctrine of judicial notice does not belong to the law of evidence
alone. It is a part and process of judicial reasoning. As one judge aptly put it, "the
court may not shut it eyes to what all others can see and understand."' The object
of this rule is to save time, labor and expense in securing and introducing evidence
on matters which are not ordinarily capable of dispute. Applying the doctrine of
judicial notice gives rise to two important and fundamental problems: (1) of what
facts will the court take judicial notice and, (2) may evidence be introduced to
rebut facts judicially noticed by the courts?
In answering the first question, the courst have agreed that, generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must
be a matter of common knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled
and not doubtful and uncertain; (3) and it must be known to be within the limits
of the jurisdiction of the court. The matter of which a court will take judicial notice
must be a subject of common and general knowledge. A fact is said to be generally
recognized or known when its existence or operation is accepted by the public without qualification or contention or capable of immediate accurate demonstration; for
example, the existence and location of highways and bridges.2 The test is whether
sufficient notoriety attaches to the fact involved as to make it proper to assume its
existence without proof. The fact that a belief is not universal, however, is not
controlling for there is hardly any belief that is accepted by everyone. Those matters familiarly known to the majority of mankind, or to those persons familiar with
the particular matters in question, or knowledge in the particular jurisdiction
which everyone of average intelligence and knowledge of things about him can be
presumed to know, are properly within the concept of judicial notice. Matters of
which the court will take notice are to a great extent uniform or fixed and cannot
depend in any way upon uncertain testimony, for as soon as a matter becomes disputable it ceases to fall under the heading of common knowledge, and so will not
be judicially recognized."
Frequently the doctrine of judicial notice is stated as a rule dispensing with
proof of certain facts, averment of them, or both. There are some matters that are
regarded as so fixed, certain and unchangeable that the courts will take judicial
notice of them as a matter of course, and a refusal to do so may be reversible error.
1 McGovern v. New York, 234 N.Y. 377.
2 Schmidt v. Allegheny Co., 303 Pa. 560.
8 Cams v. Matthews, 106 Pa. Super. 582.
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For instance, there are the laws of the forum, the coincidence of the days of the
week and the days of the month, 4 and the hours of sunrise and sunset. 5
On the other hand, there are many matters not so fixed and unchangeable,
and in regard to these the courts are permitted a discretion, either to assume that
these are true until found false, or to require evidence in the first instance. The
courts are not bound to take judicial notice of certain facts, even though such facts
may be well-established matters of common knowledge; however, they may requite
supplemental proof.6 Whether a court will take judicial notice of well-established
matters of fact is discretionary with the trial court, the rulings of which usually
depend upon the nature of the subject, the issue involved, the apparent justice
and the circumstances of the particular case. Language found in many cases to the
effect that the court is bound to take judicial notice of this or that fact means no
more than that the court may do so if in its discretion, the sense of justice requires
it. This is proved by the fact that decisions are rarely reversed, because the trial
court refuses to take judicial notice of matters of fact without proof. As far as precedent on particular points is concerned prior decisions are of little value because
time, place and surrounding circumstances must be taken into consideration when
a court is faced with the problem of deciding whether or not it will take judicial
notice of a certain factual situation.
It is not essential that matters of judicial notice be actually known to the judge."
If the facts are proper subjects of judicial notice, the judge may inform himself
in any way he sees fit. Judges may refresh their memories upon matters properly
subjected to judicial notice from encydopedias, dictionaries or other publications,
although it is clear that the mere appearance of facts in the latter does not entitle
them to be judicially noticed, unless they are such as to be part of the common
knowledge. In accord with the above reasoning, it is proper to receive evidence as
to facts that will be judicially noticed when such proof is received merely as an
aid to the memory of the court. The effect of a fact which has been judicially noticed
not only relieves the parties from the necessity of setting forth in their pleadings
many essential parts of their case, but also relieves them of the burden of proving
such facts.
This brings us to the second question-may evidence be introduced to rebut
facts judicially noticed?
Here the cases seem to be in conflict and confusion. Some cases hold that a
fact judicially noticed is indisputable and therefore no evidence can be introduced
to rebut such facts. 9 Other cases hold that a matter judicially noticed means merely
Wilson v. Van Leer, 127 Pa. 371.
5 Kovalehik v. Demo, 94 Pa. Super. 167.
6 Brush v. Lehigh Val. Coal Co., 290 Pa. 322.
7 Seemens' Estate, 346 Pa. 610.
8 Seemens' Estate, 346 Pa. 610.
9 Utah Construction Co. v. Berg, et al, 68 Ariz. 285.
4
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that it is taken as true until the opponent offers competent evidence to the contrary.
How can we reconcile the two views? Reading the cases carefully, we find the courts
of the first group have divided the facts which are to be judicially noticed into two
distinct classes, the first of which has facts which are contained in official documents and these documents themselves are sources of indisputable accuracy 1° When
a case such as this arises and the court rules that the fact is judicially noticed and that
no evidence to the contrary will be admitted, the party against whom the fact operates
has not been prejudiced. In the second class, these same courts hold that, in cases
where the facts are not unchangeable, they must first determine whether the fact is
within the domain of judicial notice. In reaching this decision the court may require
the parties to submit information to refresh the memory of the court. Each party is
permitted to submit its side of the argument as to whether the fact should be considered within the domain of judicial notice. The court, after hearing this information
and refreshing its memory, makes a ruling that it will or will not take judicial
notice of a certain fact. Thus the courts adhere to the one view that, "you cannot
rebut an indisputable fact." They reach this decision by the rationalization that they
are not receiving contrary evidence, but are merely refreshing th'eir memory as to
whether or not the fact is within the domain of judicial notice. Cases such as these
are often cited as holding "a fact judicially noticed takes the place of proof and is
of equal force and cannot be rebutted." Looking at the holding alone seems to place
at an extreme disadvantage the party against whom the judicially noticed fact operates. In actual practice, however, he has had an opportunity to offer his contrary
evidence and suffers no disadvantage."
Cases cited as contrary to this view hold that a party may introduce evidence
to rebut a fact which has been judicially noticed. The difference between the two
holdings, however, seems to be more apparent than actual, because they both reach
similar results. The only real difference seems to be in the time when the contrary
evidence will be received. In group number one, contrary views are thrashed out
and then the court rules that it will or will not take judicial notice. In group number
two, the court takes judicial notice in the first instance based on its own discretion
and then allows the party affected to offer competent evidence to the contrary.
This latter view is reflected in a recent case, Nicketta, et at v. National Tea Co., 338
Ill. App. 159, where the court took judicial notice that a human being could not
contract the disease, trichinosis, from eating pork which had been properly cooked.
Then it went 'on to say in the opinion that this fact judicially noticed was conclusive
as against the plaintiff, because the plaintiff offered no scientist, doctor, book,
article, test, or other authority which would 'establish or tend to establish that a
human being can acquire trichinosis from eating pork which had been properly
cooked. Considering only the results, it is of little importance which group of

10 Snyder Estate, 346 Pa. 615.

11 Snyder Estate, 346 Pa. 615.
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cases we follow as long as we give the adverse party, at some time in the proceeding, a right to challenge facts which are to be used against him.
The authorities on the law of evidence seem to follow the rationale of the
cases or vice-versa. In Wigmore's "Code of the Rules of Evidence," § 3076, we find
the rul-e stated in the following words:
"The judicial notice of a fact is only a provisional ruling, which becomes conclusive if not 'bona fide' disputed; the party disfavored by the
fact may therefore introduce evidence to the contrary."
This statement of the rule seems consistent with the underlying reasons for
the doctrine of judicial notice. The list of things covered by judicial notice is constantly expanding and no exact limit can be placed upon it. That which will be
matter of common knowledge in one country or locality, and be judicially noticed
in another, may be entirely beyond the knowledge or experience of the court or the
people. 12 Facts of which the court will not take judicial notice today may be
recognized tomorrow as out of the realm of proof, and facts which are recognized
today as indisputable may be proved false and unfounded by new discoveries and
advances in science. Of necessity, judicial knowledge is continually extended
to keep pace with the advance of art, science and general knowledge. To hold
otherwise would be to deny progress and such a position would be untenable. Thus,
the courts, in applying the doctrine of judicial notice, merely reflect the state of
the times and progress. If we accept the above reasoning as sound, then we must
also accept the proposition that when there is a bona fide dispute as to whether
the matter falls within the domain of judicial notice, the party disfavored by the
fact must be allowed to introduce evidence to the contrary.
The power of the court to take judicial notice should b'e exercised with caution,
and if there is any doubt whatever either of the fact itself or that it is a matter of
common knowledge, evidence should be required. The American Law Institute's
Code of Evidence sets up many rules with the view of protecting the rights of both
parties to a proceeding, when the problem of judicial notice arises. These safeguards are worthy of adoption by any jurisdiction. These rules are as follows:
(1) requiring the party requesting judicial notice to furnish the judge with sufficient information to enable him to comply with the request and to give each adverse
party such notice, if any, as the judge deems necessary to enable the adverse party
fairly to prepare to meet the request; 13 (2) the judge shall inform the parties
of any matter to be judicially noticed by him and afford each of them reasonable
opportunity to present to him information relevant to the propriety of taking such
judicial notice, and the judge should not take judicial notice unless the matter is
clearly indisputable; 14 (3) require the judge to include in the record of the trial
12 State v. Main, 69 Conn. 123; State v. Danin, 64 S.D. 309.

13 Rule 803.
14 Rule 804.
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a statement of the matter as so noticed and if tried by jury, shall direct the jury
to find the matter as so noticed; 15 (4) by allowing both the trial judge in proceedings after trial and the reviewing court to take judicial notice, but requiring in
either event that the parties be afforded reasonable opportunity to present information relevant to the propriety of taking such judicial notice and to the tenor of the
6
matter to be noticed.1
The views taken by the cases and those of the authorities all recognize that
even though the court has validly taken judicial notice of a fact situation, a party is
not prevented from showing that the facts cannot be applied in the particular case.
Such was the case in Mazmanian v. Kuken, 189 N.E. 815, where the court took

judicial notice that a depression existed in the United States during the early 1930's,
which condition was within the domain of judicial notice, the plaintiff could not
rebut the propriety of noticing the depression, but he could show that he was in
fact employed during those years and would have had continued employment had
not the injury occuired.17
Many of these rules are generally recognized in practice, and if adopted in toto
would be entirely consistent with the objectives of judicial notice-saving time, labor
and expense in getting at the true issues of the case and rendering justice to all parties
concerned.
Donald R. Mikesell
15 Rule 805.
16 Rule 806.

17 Accord, Commonwealth v. Marzynski, 149 Mass. 68.

